

SECTION I, NARRATIVE

CHAPTER V

JANUARY

(Except for Reduction of COLMAR Pocket which is covered in Chapter VI)

237. On 1 January 1945, General Eisenhower, having studied Sixth Army Group's estimate of 30 December, called General Devers by telephone. In a manner to maintain security he directed prompt withdrawal of VI Corps to main positions in the VOSGES. It was agreed that the XXI Corps including the 12th Armored Division and the 36th Infantry Division, then under SHAEF control, could be used by General Devers if needed to meet the impending hostile attack. (129)

238. On being appraised of this decision, General Jenkins and Colonel Harrison went to Seventh Army command post by cub plane to convey the new instructions and discuss the resulting problems with members of Seventh Army staff. General Devers followed in a cub plane. General Brooks of VI Corps had been summoned and a conference was held including the above named officers and General Patch.

239. Following some discussion General Patch directed General Brooks to pull back behind the Maginot Line that night because of the threat to the left flank of the salient he then held. Little time had been available to VI Corps for preparation of defensive works in the frozen ground, but it was believed that use of the Maginot defenses would prove very helpful. Although at this stage the timing of Sixth Army Group operations was not definitely fixed, the plans contemplated generally an orderly withdrawal with the first, second and third intermediate positions being reached by daylight of the second, third and fourth of January respectively and the main position on the morning of the fifth. The successive withdrawals were to be made under cover of darkness.

240. Also on the afternoon of 1 January, General Smith, Chief of Staff, SHAEF, called General Devers to explain the plan adopted with respect to the three F.F.I. divisions offered for the defense of STRASBOURG. This was to select the best of the three divisions and pool the equipment of all so as to provide one strong and well equipped unit. That night Major General du Vigier, French Military Governor of STRASBOURG, was at VITTEL for conference with General Devers regarding the defense of the city.

241. On 2 January the Command Post of Seventh Army was moved to LUNEVILLE and that of XXI Corps to BACCARAT.




SIXTH ARMY GROUP
SITUATION MAP

2 JAN. 1945

TIME: 1030 A

NORTH FLANK

KILOMETRES




MILES

NOV 13



SIXTH ARMY GROUP
SITUATION MAP
2 JAN. 1945
TIME: 1030 A
SOUTH FLANK ONLY



VWI
AB

SWITZERLAND

SEVENTH

FIRST FRENCH

ST BLASIE

ST DIE

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BOMB LINE

NOV 14

NOV 14

242. The period from 2 January to 25 January was in a sense unique in Sixth Army Group History. The enemy, largely deprived of the fruits of his ARDENNES breakthrough and driven back to his starting line with serious losses, made a determined attempt to break through the front of the Seventh Army to recapture STRASBOURG and as much as possible of the ALSACE Plain. True, the power he could muster for this attack was less than in the North, but he knew our lines were thin and that the results of a breakthrough would be very significant because of the lack of powerful Allied reserves in or reasonably near the sectors selected for attack. Therefore an assault, once it penetrated the defensive line could not well be contained and forced back. With the predominance of power and initiative in enemy hands, and lacking the strength to be sufficiently strong everywhere on a static basis, it became necessary to predict and anticipate his successive thrusts at various points, blunting them with artillery fire and moving the limited reserves into positions where they could limit the width and depth of the salients driven into our positions. Thus it was a critical period and for this reason a number of the concurrent "Redline" dispatches are included so that from them and the situation maps an understanding of the action may be secured. Tension at the Headquarters was probably somewhat greater than is reflected in the "Redline" dispatches.

243. The "Redline" dispatch sent 2 January is paraphrased below:


The front of the entire First French Army sector was marked by patrol activity and harassing enemy artillery fire on both sides.

The enemy launched a series of strong probing attacks yesterday along the XV Corps front from SARREGUEMINES (Q-5257) to NEUNHOFFEN (Q-9246). In the 106 Cav Gp sector 5 enemy counterattacks were repulsed during the day. However our lines were drawn back and are now from Q-3567 to Q-2872.

On the 44th Div front about 500 enemy tried to cross the BLIES River at several points but were thrown back. Our lines are but slightly withdrawn in this sector. CCA of the 12 Arm'd Division has established a screen along their rear on the line BINNING (Q-6549), ACHERN (Q-5949) and WITTERING (Q-5750).

Approximately 600 enemy attacked the Task Force Hudelson yesterday and gained some ground before it was contained. Their line now runs generally from Q-8846 to Q-7846. Elements of the 275 Inf (70 Div) have formed a defensive line slightly to the rear on

NORTH FLANK



SEVENTH

their right flank between Q-9044 and Q-8742. An arm'd infantry battalion is moving to the vicinity of BAEFENTHAL (Q-8442) and a tank battalion of the 14 Arm'd Div is moving to the vicinity of REICHOFFEN (Q-9537) to support them.

244. On 2 January a cable was received from SHAEF directing the following:

a. As early as possible be prepared to release the two divisions in SHAEF reserve.

b. As to the units East of the main position, (The VOSGES), their integrity must not be endangered.

c. Rather than to impair in any way ability to carry out a and b above, be prepared to accept loss of territory East of the VOSGES and all its political consequences.

245. Staff Memorandum Number 2, relating to Battle Participation awards was issued 3 January. (130)

246. The "Redline" dispatch for 3 January is paraphrased below:

The entire First French Army front is quiet. Only scattered light artillery and patrol activity is reported.

Yesterday the enemy continued his strong probing attacks in an effort to find the weak points on our lines. In the 45th Div Zone 200-300 enemy supported by tanks attacked SE from BAERENTAL (Q-8442). Elements of the 79th Div, regrouped into an emergency counter attacking force, recovered the lost ground and regained the outskirts of BAERENTAL. The remainder of the division line which runs NE from this point is under heavy enemy pressure at Q-9346, Q-8744 and Q-8742.

An enemy attack of 2 Company strength reached REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) and WILDERGRUTH (Q-7838) in the Task Force HUDELSON sector before it was contained by elements of the 313 Inf (79 Div). Counter attacks have restored our lines in part.

Between SARREINSBERG (Q-7442) and REYERSWILLER (Q-7549) efforts by the enemy to widen his salient were stopped by elements of the 141 Inf (36 Div) and 179 Inf (45 Div). A counter attack made by these 2 RCTs plus the 399 Inf (100 Div) was gaining ground toward MOUTERHOUSE (Q-7942).

On the 44 Div front the 17 SS Panzer Division supported 500 enemy infantry in their attack across the BLIES River. 1 Company succeeded in establishing a small bridgehead at the close of the day. Our artillery stopped these attacks taking a great toll of enemy personnel and equipment.

No further attacks were made in the 106 Cav Gp sector yesterday and our troops have regained a large part of the ground lost the preceding day. The critical day is believed to be today.

247. It is always hard on the morale of combat troops to require them to give up territory which has cost them much effort and blood without exacting a similar toll from the enemy. To provide better understanding of the unity of Allied effort and to sustain the usual high morale of his forces, General Devers published the following:

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

4 January 1945

ORDER OF THE DAY)

NUMBER 1) : TO THE TROOPS OF THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP:

The Seventh United States Army and the First French Army have been assigned, and are at present carrying out, a most important mission in the Allies' over-all operations on the Western Front.

To delay the final outcome of the war, the enemy, after repeated defeats which drove him back to his own soil, desperately launched a counter-offensive in the North. His drive has been successfully blunted and the salient he created is now under tremendous attack by Allied ground and air forces.

After campaigns, which have carried the American and French troops of the Sixth Army Group triumphantly to the Rhine and the region of the Saar, we are forced to halt and regroup our forces before again advancing to the attack.

The enemy is probing our lines. He is looking for weakness.

I am confident your strength and courage, which have triumphed over him on every battlefield from the beachhead to the Rhine, will not fail.

Our objective is to destroy the enemy. This will require the maximum effort of every officer and enlisted man in the Sixth Army Group.

The winning of a decisive victory is in your hands.

I am confident you will be victorious.

/s/ JACOB L. DEVERS
JACOB L. DEVERS,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding.

248. The "Redline" dispatch sent on 4 January is paraphrased below:

The front of the First French Army remained generally quiet. The enemy offered some opposition northwest of COLMAR and made numerous infiltration attempts in the LACNOIR region. All of these were repulsed.

The bulk of the 45th and 79th Divs of the VI Corps have been withdrawn to the MAGINOT line defenses. Heavy enemy pressure continues on the east and south flank of the HARDT Mts salient but an advance of 1 Km north of BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) was made by 275 Inf (70 Div). On the west flank of VI Corps elements of the 179th Inf Regt are attacking from Q-7370 in the direction of MOUTERHOUSE (Q-7942), and the 399 and 141st Inf Regts are blocking the roads farther north.

In the XV Corps sector the enemy penetrated the right flank of the 44 Div and reached GROS REDERCHING (Q-6252). Slight infiltrations were made as far as ACHERN (Q-5949). These were repulsed by elements of the 2 DB whose advance continued north from ACHERN to recapture GROS REDERCHING. The center and left of the 44 Div is still holding on the BLIES River line. The remainder of the front was quiet.

Marshalling yards of ZWEIBRUCKEN and NEUNKIRCHEN were having a turnover yesterday. FRIEBURG yards were apparently very active. During the night of Jan 2-3 heavy southward road movement was reported between BASLE and KARLSRUHE.

249. During the first few days of January General Barr was in the PARIS area for close liaison with SHAEF during this rather critical period. During the days of 1 and 2 January SHAEF's views regarding Sixth Army Group operations were that a withdrawal to main positions should be made

without regard to the defense of STRASBOURG for which Sixth Army Group was said to have no responsibility. On 3 January however, the instructions for Sixth Army Group were changed and it was given the responsibility for the defense of STRASBOURG. (131)

250. Bearing on this matter is a letter from General de Gaulle to General Eisenhower urging the defense of STRASBOURG and as much of ALSACE as possible and another letter in somewhat the same tenor from General de Lattre to General Devers. (132)

251. The decision to defend STRASBOURG, and in general the means to be employed, were made known to General de Lattre by General Shepard, Deputy Chief of Staff, Sixth Army Group, and by Liaison Officers on 3 January. During a personal interview with General Devers on the morning of 4 January General Patch was advised of the new decision and the resulting general plan for employment of Seventh Army. Confirmation by cable (BX-22329) was sent to both armies and minor arrangements were initiated by appropriate staff officers by means of telephone conversations.

252. On the evening of 4 January General Smith, Chief of Staff, SHAEF, and General Juin, Chief of Staff of National Defense for FRANCE, arrived from PARIS to discuss the steps being taken for the defense of STRASBOURG. At a conference with General Devers and the chiefs of the general staff sections the situation and the plans already initiated were explained to the visitors who expressed their concurrence. These plans were substantially as covered in Letter of Instructions Number 8 which appears under date of 7 January. Details of the plans were dispatched to the two armies for information and comment early 5 January. (133) On receipt of replies that no conflicts would occur they were confirmed and ordered into effect by dispatches on the afternoon of that same day. (134)

253. On 5 January a cable was sent to the two army commanders directing that command of the STRASBOURG area pass to the Commanding General, First French Army on relief of US units in that area, which relief was to be completed by 2400 hours that night. Also that the Seventh Army was to withdraw from the MAGINOT LINE North of HAGENAU only under pressure. In accordance with the above direction, cables were dispatched that same day as follows: Seventh Army was instructed that the bulk of VI Corps must be in main positions by 5 January organized in great depth for defense, First French Army to withdraw bulk of command on North flank to main (VOSGES) position also by 5 January and organized in great depth. Advance positions of Seventh Army and those on North flank of First French Army to be held by

light, highly mobile forces, able to withdraw rapidly in face of strong German offensive action. (135)

254. The "Redline" message sent 5 January is paraphrased below:

An attempt on LOECHLE (A-8395) and enemy raids on KEMBS (A-8399) accompanied by heavy artillery fire on both places were repulsed by elements of the First French Corps. There are no other changes on the First French Army front. The enemy continues to harass our forward elements along the northern half of the pocket area using spasmodic artillery fire.

Along the MAGINOT Line from the RHINE through WINDSTEIN (Q-9644) VI Corps front is very quiet. Our patrols advanced as far as WISSEMBOURG before establishing contact with the enemy. The 45th Division reinforced by one regiment from the 79th Division and two regiments from Task Force Herren has the responsibility for the salient area in the HARDT Mountains. During the past 24 hours our troops in this sector have been materially increased. We now have one regiment reinforced in the PHILLIPSBURG area (Q-8842). We hold the town but are meeting strong resistance on its northern edge. We also hold high ground on three sides of BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) but the enemy is in the town. The 313th Infantry (79th Division) surrounds REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) but in spite of our heavy observed fire some enemy remain in the town. 180th Infantry is attacking north from the vicinity of Q-7637 while 276th Infantry (TF Herren), in a defensive role, is holding the WINGENINGWILLER Road. 179th Infantry holds SARREINSBERG (Q-7442) and MEISENTHAL (Q-7241) and is attacking along the road to the north to open the road to LEMBERG. LEMBERG is held firmly by the 141st Infantry (36th Division) which is attached to the 100th Division of the XV Corps.

Along the northern front of the 100th Division there is no change. Enemy infiltrations again reached ACHERN (Q-6049) and GROS REDERCHING (Q-6252) but have been mopped up. LA BLIES River sector of the 44th Division continues quiet. 103rd Division has only light contact with the enemy. A 103rd Division patrol advanced 4 Km's to the north before gaining sufficient contact to permit taking prisoners.

255. On 5 January Administrative Letter Number 8 was published as quoted below:

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

5 January 1945

ADMINISTRATIVE LETTER)

NUMBER

8)

1. The responsibility for supply and evacuation of the 3d DIA remains with the First French Army, who will also assume responsibility for supply of Class I, III, and V for the 1st DMI on a date to be agreed between the Army Commanders which will be not later than 14 January. Thereafter, Seventh Army will not be responsible for supply and evacuation of any French units outside of Seventh Army area. In order to support the French troops in the STRASBOURG area and south thereof, SOLOC (CONAD) will load and deliver appropriate tonnage of supplies via rail over the LUNEVILLE-SAVERNE Line. If the tactical situation precludes use of railheads in the area of First French Army, arrangements will be made between the respective Army Commanders for the use of railheads in the Seventh Army area east of SAVERNE.

2. The responsibility for supply and evacuation of the 3d Division (U.S.), and its attached U.S. troops or any other U.S. units that may be placed under the operational control of First French Army, will remain a responsibility of Seventh Army. In order to meet this responsibility Seventh Army will have exclusive or joint use of adequate Line of Communication facilities and other necessary installations in the area of the First French Army as may be required, under arrangements to be made between the respective Army Commanders.

3. The provisions of Paragraphs 1, 5, and 6 of Administrative Letter No. 7, dated 29 December 1944, remain in effect. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 7 of Administrative Letter No. 7 are rescinded.

4. The main supply depots and other installations of both Armies will be located west of the VOSGES MOUNTAINS. Only the minimum supplies and equipment essential to accomplishment of the assigned missions of the Armies will be maintained east of the main defensive positions (see Paragraph 2 of Letter of Instruction No. 7, this Headquarters, dated 28 December 1944). All supply dumps, equipment, and installations (both allied and enemy) remaining east of the main defensive positions will be prepared for destruction. Armies will insure complete destruction of such supplies

and equipment if threatened with capture.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

/s/ J. L. TARR
J. L. TARR,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

256. a. Early on the morning of 5 January a very unfortunate event took place in the sector of the Western French Forces. Beginning about 0400 some 300 British Lancasters with 7 ton bomb loads attacked the town of ROYAN with resultant heavy casualties among French civilians, about 1,000 killed and bulk of the remainder wounded, and considerable property damage. ROYAN was several miles within the enemy lines and the inhabitants had been urged to evacuate the town. Many had done so, being permitted to cross the lines into territory under Allied control, but from 1,500 to 2,000 were still in ROYAN on the morning of the raid. Most of the bombs struck the residential and business districts of the town with the main streets, Rue de la Republique and Rue Gambetta heavily hit. There was little damage to the extensive enemy installations. The G-2 overlay indicates that very few of these were within the bombed area.

b. Considering events leading up to this raid we find that General Devers and General de Larminat, commanding the Western French Forces (WFF) were in agreement that air support for Operation Independence was desirable. Contacting General Royce, commanding the First Tactical Air Force, they learned that no specific commitments could be made but that it was possible that bombing units under training in England could be made available.

c. The Air Commander, WFF, was General Corniglion-Molinier. There was a U.S. air liaison group assigned to his headquarters and the locations of the enemy installations in the ROYAN sector were known to his operations section.

d. An overlay showing enemy installations was sent by the Commanding General WFF to the Commanding General Sixth Army Group and on 22 November prints therefrom were furnished to the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, First TACAF. (136) (Receipt acknowledged by telephone)

e. Two or three weeks before the raid in question a staff officer from First TACAF visited WFF Headquarters in COGNAC for about 10 days. The official detailed map plot

of enemy installations was available to him. This map showed the latest and most accurate information as to suitable bombing targets. When asked, for his views regarding the project, Colonel Trevor W. Swett, GSC, Liaison Officer from Headquarters Sixth Army Group, replied that he considered air support a good idea but regretted the proposal to handle it as a matter of student training and stressed the importance of having the key or lead pilots, after advance briefing, make preliminary reconnaissance flights over the target area so that it would be familiar to them and chance of error removed.

f. General de Larminat favored priority to targets in the POINTE DE GRAVE area. This was because of the extremely difficult land approaches and concrete emplacements too strong to be affected by the largest land guns available for the operation, (155mm) for which a rigorously limited quantity of ammunition was available.

g. On 10 December General Royce, commanding First TACAF conferred with General de Larminat at the latter's headquarters. General Royce left the conference with the impression that such an attack as was made on ROYAN 5 January would be agreeable to General de Larminat at any time after 15 December 1944. General de Larminat had intended to give no such impression. Their respective understandings of the agreements reached at this conference are contained in General de Larminat's letter of 13 January 1945 and General Royce's memorandum of 17 January 1945, both to General Devers. (137)(138)

h. On 4 January a message as follows was received by Headquarters Sixth Army Group:

FROM: AIR STAFF SHAEF

Request you notify Allied Units concerned in that area. RAF Bomber Command will attack ROYAN with 200 aircraft at 0400 and with 100 aircraft at 0530 5 Jan.

This information was relayed to COGNAC by means of a message to 8th Signal Center for Commanding General, WFF, and was received at the Signal Center at 042020A hours. At about the same hour a similar message from First TACAF was received by 8th Signal Center for delivery to WFF Aviation. Decoding, processing and delivery of the message for Commanding General, WFF, to the French Headquarters message center all consumed a little over four hours, the message being delivered by a sergeant of the liaison group (U.S.) at 050030 hours. The message was still in English, as translation was normally accomplished at the French head-

quarters. The American sergeant did not speak French and did not acquaint the French message center personnel with the content of the message. The message however was marked "Urgent". Not until after the raid was the message translated into French. Neither was any officer, U.S. or French, informed of its import prior to the bombing.

i. The raid, therefore, came as a surprise to practically everyone in the area, and at the COGNAC airfield it was first assumed that the planes were German. A more expeditious handling of the messages in COGNAC would have obviated surprise to Headquarters Western French Forces but there still would have been no reason to suppose the town of ROYAN itself would be heavily hit and so the course of events would probably have been changed but little if at all.

j. Air operations in the WFF sector were agreed to by Headquarters Sixth Army Group not for strategic purposes but as operations in support of ground forces. Since the attack by these ground forces had been postponed for an indefinite period there was no lack of time for full coordination with them as to the specific targets or areas to be attacked. The message announcing attack of "ROYAN" was ineffective for coordination because it was naturally understood to refer to enemy defenses around the perimeter of the town, and in the ROYAN area generally, rather than to the interior of the town which was largely devoid of remunerative targets and inhabited by French civilians.


k. It appears that any one of the following reasonable precautions would have prevented this costly mistake.

(1) Air Force agencies should have consulted the supported ground forces well in advance to agree on specific targets or areas whose attack would assist the operations of the supported units. This was essential to insure against waste of gasoline and bombs.


(2) Advance briefing and daylight reconnaissance flight by lead or key pilots as recommended by Sixth Army Group Liaison Officer.

(3) Although the WFF Officers concerned had reason to believe the Air Force agencies were aware of the French population in ROYAN, their position would have been stronger had they specifically excluded the city of ROYAN from the area included on the enemy side of the bomb line and made certain that First TACAF knew of the large number of civilians remaining in ROYAN after 15 December 1944.

1. An extract of Colonel Swett's report of 23 January



SIXTH ARMY GROUP
SITUATION MAP
5 JAN. 1945
TIME: 1030 A
NORTH FLANK



SEVENTH
ARMY
FIRST FRENCH

is included as Document Number 87. General Devers letter of 18 January to General de Larminat is included as Document Number 88.

257. Also on 5 January Distribution List Number 1 was published. It provided five types of distribution for the sixteen varieties of publications regularly issued. (141)

258. The "Redline" dispatch for 6 January is paraphrased below:

A raid by the enemy on ILE NAPOLEON (V-7408) preceded by an arty preparation was repulsed. Likewise strong enemy patrol activity in the vicinity of ERSTEIN (V-9580) and NEUNKIRCHEN (V-9268) were without results although the latter was held briefly by the enemy.

Further north on the VI Corps RHINE front a hostile raid was carried out in the vicinity of BAMBSHEIM (R-1110) and the town was occupied. Elements of the 232 Inf and 242 Inf (TF LINDEN) are attacking and mopping up the enemy. Elements of the 314 Inf (79 Div) are also enroute to this area.

The VI Corps front along the MAGINOT Line remained quiet. In the HARDT Mts salient close contact with the enemy was maintained with some relaxation in enemy pressure noted. The only material change in the salient was an advance from 1-2 KMS, made by the 180 Inf and 313 Inf between MEISENTHAL (Q-7241) and REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037).

On the XV Corps front there was no change in our positions and enemy was very quiet.

The new inter-Army boundary is as follows: West of V-5484, no change - ACHERN (R-2405) - GAMBSHEIM (R-1110) - HOERDT (R-0311) - OLWISHEIM (Q-9611) - TRUCHTSHEIM (Q-9007) - MARLSSESHEIM (Q-8202) - OBERHASLACH (V-6995) - GRANDFONTAINE (V-5788) (all to the First French Army). Command of the STRASBOURG sector passes to the First French Army. The 4 RTT (3 DIA) has relieved US units in the area. The 3 RTA (3 DIA) arrived in the area and the remainder of the Div will follow as soon as relieved by elements of the BILLOTE Div. Advance elements of this Div have arrived in the REMIREMONT area (K-1844) already.

259. Following up SHAEF's offer of an F.F.I. Division as mentioned in paragraph 240, an inspection team had been sent to PARIS to ascertain the condition and value of these troops. Their report follows:

HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO #23, US ARMY
G-3 SECTION

6 January 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: The Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Inspection of 10th French Infantry Division

I - DISCUSSION

1. Upon arrival at Headquarters, 10th French Infantry Division at about 1030 AM, 1 January 1945, General Billotte gave the officers of Sixth Army Group and SHAEF Mission FRANCE his estimate of the status of the division (Tab A).

2. The schedule followed in inspecting elements of the division is shown in Tab B.

3. After completion of all except the last day's inspection, the group of officers participating in the inspection assembled and discussed the remarks made by General Billotte on the First day (Tab A) and agreed that these remarks were essentially correct with the exceptions noted in Tab C. A summary of the status of the division is shown in Tab D. The conclusions reached were that while the morale of the division is high and the individuals have a great incentive to kill Germans, neither the division, nor any part thereof, will be suitable, according to American standards, for combat until completely re-equipped and given a period of 3 to 4 months training. The maximum role in which it should be employed until then would be in a security role. Detailed reports submitted by G-1, Artillery, G-4, and Signal representatives are attached hereto as Sections I, II, III, and IV, respectively.

4. Inspections made on 5 January (last day) further confirmed the conclusions reached in paragraph 3, above.

5. Additional detailed information has been compiled, but is not being submitted with this report. It can be made available if so desired.

II - ACTION RECOMMENDED

1. That the 10th Infantry Division not be accepted for employment in an offensive role until it has received suitable equipment and has been trained for a period of not less than 4 months.

2. That the 10th Infantry Division not be accepted for employment in a defensive role, except in dire emergency, until after it has received suitable equipment and received at least 3 months training.

3. That in event necessity dictates the employment of separate regiments of this division in a defensive role, they be put in a quiet sector, rotated for training purposes, provided additional equipment, and backed up by experienced supporting arms.

III- CONCURRENCE

1. Chief of Inspection Section,
SHAEF Mission FRANCE: _____
(General Kingman)

/s/ R. L. VITTRUP
R. L. VITTRUP,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
DAC/S, G-3 Troops.

Obviously, small reliance could be placed in such troops for the defense of STRASBOURG and since General Larkin, Commanding SOLOC, had strongly recommended against acceptance of further French units because he felt SOLOC's supply capacity was already stretched to the limit, it might happen that acceptance of this French unit would prevent or delay acceptance of a fully trained and equipped U.S. division at a later date. On the other hand these troops, hurriedly equipped, would be capable of taking over a very considerable defensive frontage in the VOSGES where lines were largely stabilized by winter snows, thus releasing experienced combat units for offensive action on the ALSACE Plain.

260. Although the Army Group Headquarters was supposed to have few administrative functions, the task of trying to secure a adequate allotment of supporting and service units was very serious and never ending and consumed a great deal of time and effort on the part of the G-3 and G-4 sections. It was important that the Army Group Headquarters handle these matters so that the armies would not have to divert undue energy from action against the enemy in their front to fight for proper logistical support from the rear, The Adjutant General's files contain a great volume of cables and correspondence on this subject and it is impracticable to follow all the intricate details of negotiations in this history. Two of these papers have been selected for inclusion in the document file, the first (142) is included because it gives an over-all picture of requirements as of early October as well as the reasons why less

than 50% of the 312 supporting and service units requested were approved by SHAEF. The second paper (143) a letter to SCAEF dated 6 November 1944, follows through by giving the complete distribution of the service units allocated 7 October.

261. Some of the difficulties resulting from SHAEF's very drastic reduction in the list of service units requested are indicated in Seventh Army Weekly G-4 report for 7 January quoted in part as follows:

1. TROOPS AND INSTALLATIONS:

b. Service Troops.

- (1) General: The moving of the Army rear boundary to the rear has materially increased the depth of the Army area and has added to the difficulties of evacuating casualties to the rear, due to the longer distances and time required for ambulance trips. In addition, the arrival during the latter part of December of nine Regimental Combat Teams of three Infantry Divisions, less the organic service troops, has emphasized the need for three additional Medical Collecting Companies and two additional Ambulance Companies. The arrival of one platoon of the 46th Medical Depot Company (Base Section) and its attachment to the 7th Medical Depot Company of the Army fills a long standing need for this personnel.

The increasing severe weather, short days and a loss of 10% of effective troops* has had a tendency to contribute to an overall reduction in the operating efficiency of some service troops. These conditions are requiring a more intense effort on the part of all concerned to meet the present demands of the Army. To relieve this situation, in addition to the above mentioned organizations, the following are also required:

- 1 Quartermaster Depot Supply Company
- 1 Quartermaster Graves Registration Company
- 1 Quartermaster Laundry Company
- 2 Ordnance Ammunition Companies
- 1 Signal Depot Company

A majority of the above type organizations are

*Withdrawals for Infantry Reinforcement training.

scheduled to be assigned to the Army in the near future, or as soon as they become available. In the meantime, the present Army service troops are carrying the burden of meeting the demands of the troops.

During the week it has been necessary to use a number of Engineer Regiments and Battalions as combat troops in defensive roles in the front line. The use of these troops in the role of Infantry has resulted in stopping, to a large extent, repairs on roads and bridges. This has further contributed to the accumulating of work that will be ultimately required of these Engineer troops.




262. The problems posed by shortage of service units are by no means simple. They resulted basically from the manpower shortage incident to fighting two major wars at once while producing arms for half the world. At this same time the need for more men in Infantry units was even more urgent than the need for increase in service units. Consequently the matter can not be dismissed by saying that the service units should have been furnished as requested. The following points seem clear; first, shortage of service units was not due to lack of foresight and timely and reiterated request by Sixth Army Group; second, the service elements that were provided deserve credit for the intensive effort put forth to compensate so far as possible for their shortage in numbers; third, the combat units merit extra credit for their splendid performance which was made the more difficult for lack of a full quota of service units; and fourth, that it is of the greatest importance that, at times when maximum effort is required, the most sound and comprehensive plans for utilization of total manpower, both service and civilian, be put into effect at once and that policies be promptly revised from time to time in accordance with changing conditions.

263. The "Redline" dispatch for 7 January, outlining operations of 6 January is paraphrased below:

The First French Army front is generally quiet. There is only patrol activity by both sides and slight enemy harassing artillery fire on some sections of the II Corps front. Reliefs and movements were effected on the II Corps front without interference.

Mopping up the GAMBSHEIM (Q-1110) area continues by elements of TF Linden and 79th Division.

Along the MAGINOT Line the front of the VI Corps



Photog-T/4 Bennett Fenberg(163) 7 January 1945.
Yanks with 57mm anti-tank gun guard road intersection near French
village of WINGEN after Germans were surrounded, Nazi mountain
fighters had infiltrated into Yank lines during the night taking
some prisoners. 45th Division troops surrounded Germans afterwards.

continues quiet. A German attack on PHILLIPSBURG (Q-8742) in the HARDT Mountains salient was repulsed. Elements of the 179th Infantry and 180th Infantry (45th Division) advanced about 1 Kilometer along a 3 mile front between MEISENTHAL (Q-7241) and REIPERTS-WILLER (Q-8037). No change in the remainder of the front.

Elements of the 114th Infantry (44th Division) advanced 1 kilometer north of GROS REDERCHING (Q-5949) on a 3 kilometer front and reduced salient in lines. On the XV Corps front there was no other change.

264. On 7 January there was considerable activity on both army fronts. The First French Army lost ground along the Rhine-Rhone Canal but the 3rd Division made advances in its zone. Seventh Army units stopped five attacks and made advances in the 45th Division zone. (DR 8 Jan)

265. The first paragraph of Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 16 for the week ending 6 January is quoted below.

1. GENERAL

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

On 30 December the enemy was opposing Seventh US Army on a line roughly east-west from LAUTERBOURG-BITCHE-SAARGUE-MINES with six divisional formations (256, 245, 361, 257, 19, 347 Infantry Divisions).


Seven divisional formations were accepted as being in reserve (21 Pz, 25 PG, 17 SS PG, 36 Inf, 172 Res, 553 and 559 Inf.). Reinforcements equivalent in strength to an estimated three divisions were considered available for this front. The bulk of these are being absorbed by units already in line or in reserve, with 6 SS Mountain already committed as a complete unit.

On 1 January the enemy launched an attack from the area with six divisions (36 Inf, 559 Inf, 17 SS PG, 257 Inf, 256 Inf, and 361 Inf).

On 6 January the enemy had in line the bulk of ten divisions (245, 256, 361, 6 SS, 257, 559, 17 SS, 36, 19, and 347) with three and possibly four identified divisions located in immediate reserve. (21 Pz, 25 PG, 172 Res and possibly 553 VG Divisions).

It is estimated that on the Seventh US Army front the enemy massed about 150-200 armored vehicles, thus increasing his capability to meet the counterattacks immediately launched by our forces.

At the present stage of operations it is difficult to discern further intentions of the enemy. So far he had succeeded in occupying the HARDT massive thus improving his operations west of the HARDT Mountains through the



WISSEMBOURG gap. However, the stubborn resistance of our forces and counterattacks in strength forced the enemy to commit the majority of his forces in the HARDT Mountains pocket, leaving him with only three or four fresh divisions for new operations.

- b. Capabilities. (see Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 15, 30 December 1944.)

Capabilities as set forth in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 15, 30 December 1944, remain basically unchanged.

Capability 1 has been attempted by the enemy and was met easily by our forces. However, the drain on the enemy's strength has not been sufficient to eliminate entirely his definitely offensive intentions. The armored strength has not yet been committed and its use will determine which of the following modifications he will employ:

- a. To await further reinforcements and carry on with his original intention.
- b. To accept a more limited objective and shift his effort from the west to the east side of the HARDT Mountains.

That the enemy could reinforce this front with the necessary offensive power can hardly be expected when his position along the rest of the front is growing critical. Since his ultimate objective - to pin down the Seventh Army - can still be effected by operating against the ALSACE Plain from the east by more complete use of the forces presently at his disposal, it may be expected that the continuation of the offensive will come in that area.


The attempt to effect this capability will be marked by the movement of armored forces toward the east along the BITCHE-WISSEMBOURG-KARLSRUHE line and an outbreak of RHINE crossings north and south of STRASBOURG, with renewed activity against the northern edge of the VOSGES pocket.

266. Operational Memorandum Number 7 was issued 7 January as follows:

7 January 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Memorandum Number 7.

TO : CG Seventh Army
CG First French Army
CG 44th AAA Brigade



1. SHAEF Message S-71908, dated 21 December 1944, defines the responsibility for coordination of defensive measures by the Army Group and Communications Zone as follows:



- a. Coordination of all defensive measures will be the responsibility of the Field Force Commander, where field forces operate in Communications Zone Areas. Operational control of local Communications Zone and other troops will automatically pass for this purpose to the Field Force Commander.
- b. The Field Force Commander to whom responsibility for coordination of defensive measures is delegated by the Army Group concerned will make the decision to execute major demolitions.

2. The Commanding Generals, Seventh Army, First French Army and 44th AAA Brigade are designated as the coordinating Field Force Commanders referred to in paragraph 1 b. When actual operations are conducted in Communication Zone area, in rear of currently assigned sectors, the Field Force Commander will be responsible for the coordination of all defensive measures. They will initiate plans relative to possible operations involving the Communications Zone. Commanding General, SOLOC has advised this headquarters that such planning should be coordinated directly with CONAD and DELTA BASE. The Army Commanders and Commanding General, 44th AAA Brigade will keep this headquarters and Commanding General, SOLOC, fully advised on arrangements made and defensive measures taken within the scope of paragraph 1. Appropriate sections regarding this planning will be included in the weekly progress reports to be submitted to this headquarters in accordance with paragraph 3 x (12) of Letter of Instructions Number 7, 28 December 1944. Commanding General, 44th AAA Brigade will also submit the weekly progress report.

3. The Commanding General, Seventh Army and Commanding General First French Army will maintain close coordination in all plans relative to defensive measures in areas in rear of army rear boundaries. Similar coordination will be maintained between First French Army and 44th AAA Brigade.

4. Army Commanders and Commanding General, 44th AAA Brigade will keep themselves fully informed of the location of vital Communications Zone installations and of defensive measures planned or taken by CONAD or DELTA BASE to include:

- a. Demolitions.
- b. Headquarters which could be used for grouping Communications Zone troops for tactical employment.
- c. Troops available for tactical employment.

- d. Troops to be employed primarily for evacuation.
- e. Troops available for preparation of defensive areas.
- f. Critical areas which must be defended.

5. Attached overlay (Annex 1) shows possible general defensive lines of Sixth Army Group.*

6. Seventh Army will be provided necessary information reference Twelfth Army Group Area by this headquarters.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ REUBEN E. JENKINS
REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

267. Letter of Instructions Number 8 was published 7 January as follows:

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

7 January 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 8.

TO : CG Seventh Army
CG First French Army

NOTE: This Letter of Instructions is to confirm supplementary and fragmentary instructions issued orally and by radio since publication of Letter of Instructions Number 7.

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.
- b. Twenty First and Twelfth Army Groups are continuing operations to reduce the German salient in the central front.
2. Sixth Army Group continues the defense in accord-

*Omitted from history. May be found in G-3 "After Action Report" for January.

ance with the provisions of Letter of Instructions Number 7 as modified by instructions contained herein.

BOUNDARIES:

- a. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: No change.
- b. Between Seventh and First French Armies: West of point V-5484, no change - GRANDFONTAINE (V-5788) - OBERHASLACH (V-6995) - MARLESHEIM (Q-8202) - TRUCHTERSHEIM (Q-9007) - OLWISHEIM (Q-9611) - HOERDT (R-0311) - GAMBERSHEIM (R-1110) - ACHERN (R-2403) (all to First French Army). (See paras 3 b (1) and 3 x (1)).
- c. South Flank: No change.

3. a. Seventh Army

- (1) Organize reserve battle position on the general line: LANDROFF (Q-1841) - BENE-STROFF (Q-2934) - SARRE UNION (Q-5338) - INGWILLER (Q-8130). Coordinate with Third Army.
- (2) Organize switch position between second and third intermediate positions along general line of MODER River between ING-WILLER and HAGENAU.
- (3) Pass to operational control of First French Army for employment in STRASBOURG sector one FA Bn (4.5 gun) at point agreed by CG First French Army. Notify Sixth AG of designation of Bn selected. Insofar as tactical situation permits, deploy heavy field artillery elements with VI Corps in such manner that incidental support from these weapons will be available to STRASBOURG defenses.
- (4) 12th Armd Div and 36th Inf Div (recently released from SHAEF reserve to Sixth Army Group) are released to Seventh Army but will be committed only on authority of CG Sixth Army Group. XXI Corps Hq and Hq Co and Corps troops are released to Seventh Army.
- (5) Withdrawal from the first and second intermediate positions and from the switch position between INGWILLER and HAGENAU will only be executed in the

face of strong enemy pressure.

- (6) See paras 3 b (1) and 3 x.

b. First French Army

- (1) Relieve US elements in STRASBOURG sector.
 - (2) Post in reserve in MOLSHEIM area approximately one infantry regiment and one armored combat command (less field artillery element) prepared to move by motor on short notice.
 - (3) 10 DI (BILLOTE Div) is assigned upon arrival.
 - (4) See paras 3 a (3) and 3 x.
- x.
- (1) Relief of US elements in STRASBOURG area and control of defenses will be under CG Seventh Army until relief is completed, at which time command of sector will pass to CG First French Army and new boundary become effective.
 - (2) Final positions for defense of the STRASBOURG area, along the general line:
BITCHE area - INGWILLER - MARNE RHINE CANAL - RHINE RIVER - intermediate positions of First French Army Northeast of SELESTAT. Withdrawal from this line to the main VOSGES positions will only be executed in face of enemy pressure requiring it.
 - (3) Limiting points on boundary between Armies for the coordination of defenses: MARLESHEIM (Q-8202); OLWISHEIM (Q-9611); GAMBERSHEIM (R-1110).
 - (4) Liaison between Armies will be as agreed by Army Commanders. Constant liaison will be maintained between US and French Corps, between US and French divisions, and between all US and French subordinate units responsible for defenses along the boundary between Armies.
 - (5) Defensive organization of the main VOSGES position and other positions, and other defensive measures mentioned in para 3 x




SIXTH ARMY GROUP
SITUATION MAP

9 JAN. 1945

TIME: 1330A

NORTH FLANK




COUNTERSIGN
CORCAGE
VEST

SIXTH ARMY GROUP
SITUATION MAP
9 JAN. 1945

TIME: 1330A

SOUTH FLANK ONLY



of Letter of Instructions Number 7,
will be pressed forward with all energy.

(6) The defense will be conducted along highly aggressive lines. It will be characterized by frequent raids on all parts of the front to secure indentifications and information and to create doubt as to our situation and intentions. This subject will be given personal attention by front line Corps and Division Commanders. Aggressive action along the COLMAR pocket will be conducted along lines which will facilitate rapid passage to a general offensive on that front.

(7) Administrative instructions applicable are contained in Administrative Letter No. 8 dated 5 January 1945. No change in Army Rear Boundaries. First French Army is given joint use of the road GRANDFONTAINE to RAON LETAPE and roads south thereof and connecting therewith. Traffic control of these roads remain responsibility of Seventh Army.

(8) No other change in Letter of Instructions Number 7.

4. See Administrative Letter Number 8.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:


DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ REUBEN E. JENKINS
REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.


268. Operations 9 January were characterized by sharp actions in both army zones. Enemy thrusts by Infantry and tanks were stopped with little or no gain and several towns and other areas recaptured. Sixteen enemy tanks were destroyed and fifty prisoners taken. (DR 10 Jan)


269. Announcement was made on 10 January of the assignment of Mr. John B. Schwertman as the American Red Cross



SIXTH ARMY GROUP
SITUATION MAP
11 JAN. 1945
TIME: 1200A

NORTH FLANK





Field Director for Headquarters Sixth Army Group.

270. The Public Relations Weekly report issued 10 January showed that the number of stories and articles written and released to the press which was 7,780 for the month of October had been built up to 29,306 for the month of December. (144)

271. On 11 January the French units in ROSSFELD and HERBESHEIM between the RHINE and L'ILL Rivers after repulsing enemy attacks withdrew to the west bank of the latter streams. In the Seventh Army zone there were slight withdrawals at some points and minor gains in others. (DR 12Jan)

272. On 12 January General Devers, with appropriate ceremony, presented medals for Legion of Merit to Colonel Harvey S. Gerry, GSC, and T/Sgt Joe E. Jeter. (145)

273. Also on 12 January General Devers dispatched an urgent personal message to General de Lattre pointing out apparent lack of organized defenses in the II French Corps zone and urging all speed in their preparation as well as effective blocking of the passes leading into the VOSGES. (146)

274. Operations on 12 January were covered in the "Red-line" dispatch substantially as follows:

It was quiet yesterday along the whole of the First French Army front except for heavy artillery fire received in area of SERMERSHEIM (V-8672) - HUTTENHEIM (V-8874) - DRAFFT (V-9781).

Fierce house-to-house fighting has taken place in RITTERSHOFFEN (R-1533). Except for one small strong point the town has been cleared of the enemy. Elements of the 315 Inf (79th Div) are fighting in HATTEN (R-1834). In the HARDT Mountain salient the 276 Inf continued to advance up to 2 kilometers against strong enemy resistance between REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) and BAERENTHAL (Q-8342)

The 103rd Division withdrew slightly south of OETING and established a defensive position on high ground there. The entire XV Corps front remained quiet.

Third Army Tactical Reconnaissance planes reported approximately 1300 Infantry and 150 vehicles including armor apparently converging on SAARBRUCKEN (Q-4670).

275. On 13 January there was heavy fighting in some sectors but little change in front lines. At noon XXI Corps took over a sector on the left of Seventh Army front by assuming command of the 103rd Division and the 106th Cavalry Group.

276. Paragraphs 1 and 2 (d) of Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 17 for the week ending 13 January 1945 are quoted below:

1. GENERAL

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Elements of thirteen divisional formations were still in contact on the Seventh US Army front at the beginning of the period. By the end of the week, active contact was being maintained only with the more aggressive units. Of these only 17 SS PG, 6 SS Mountain, and 36 Infantry Division showed marked sensitivity, while 21 Panzer, 25 PG, 256 VG and 553 VG were evidently using the temporary lull in the HAGUENAU area to gather strength for an attack. An increase in movement toward this area indicates the imminent arrival of reinforcements. There is definitely a need both for infantry and for armor if the enemy intends to press home his avowed purpose of freeing ALSACE. Continuous ground reports and movement tabulations make 10 SS and 7 Para Divisions the most likely of the candidates for this front, now that 711 Infantry Division has been identified on the Eastern Front and 11 Panzer seems to be moving closely behind the front in the MERZIG-SAARBRUCKEN area.

On the First French Army front, the 106 Panzer Brigade and all of the eight divisional formations except 16 VG Division were identified during the week. Reinforcements were still arriving in numbers sufficient to allow an increase in strength in spite of some losses. The rebuilt power of 106 Panzer Brigade was notable, and 269 Infantry Division must still be accounted the best unit in the area. However, there is no evidence that the enemy is bringing in any new formations of offensive proportions. On the contrary, the quality of reinforcements arriving seems to be declining.

b. Capabilities

The enemy's capabilities remain basically unchanged from those previously set forth in Weekly Intelligence Summaries No. 15 and 16.

The acceptance of a more limited intention of the Seventh US Army front is now obvious. Even in the ALSACE plain, enemy dispositions seem to indicate that STRASBOURG is the eventual objective, with SAVERNE now only a dim hope.

However, to carry out what would appear to be his logical plan-advances south and southeast from the HARDT Mountains and against HAGUENAU, with aggressive action out of the RHINE bridgehead and due north from the COLMAR pocket-more strength is necessary.

The capabilities in the COLMAR pocket are also more limited. The relief of 269 Infantry Division by 338 VG and the subsequent shift of strength to the COLMAR-SELESTAT area further reduces the possibility of an attack northwest against the ST DIE-MOLSHEIM road directly from the HOHNECK area. Although the capability of action against MULHOUSE cannot be entirely discounted, the attempt to move directly north out of the pocket towards STRASBOURG must be favored as the primary German intention. Sufficient strength for a major operation - or even for this operation alone, should the HAGUENAU area be completely dominated by the Allies - is not present in the area. That the enemy could find the necessary forces in the Black Forest is always possible, but hardly probable at this time. Finally, the extension of a long flank along the RHINE-RHONE canal under heights now completely controlled by the Allies is not without its obvious weakness. A larger number of enemy troops will be required as the enemy moves forward than he could spare for so limited a profit.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar Vosges Front)

(d) ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar Vosges Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve:
(Combat Effectives)

Seventh US Army	32,000
First French Army	17,000 *

Artillery Effectives:

Seventh US Army	15,000
First French Army (East of RHINE)	5,000

Reserves:

Build up opposite Seventh US Army	10,000 **
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(*) Estimate has been raised on the basis of reports of reinforcements in VOSGES pocket.

(**) Estimate lowered due to the commitment of 21 Panzer; 25 PG; 553 VG Division.

Units available in Black Forest	15,000
<hr/>	
T O T A L	94,000
Tanks and SP Guns:	
Seventh US Army in Contact	150-180
Seventh US Army in Reserve	70
First French Army in Contact	50- 60
First French Army in Reserve	30- 50
<hr/>	
T O T A L	300-360

277. On 13 January letters of commendation were sent to the commanders of four Infantry Divisions of the Seventh Army as follows:

HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH ARMY GROUP
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO 23

13 January 1945

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO : Commanding General, Headquarters 44th Infantry Division, APO 44.
THRU: Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758.

Since the night of 31 December 1944 the 44th Infantry Division has achieved new successes. Receiving the initial impetus of the main enemy attack on the evening of January 2, you maintained the integrity of your defenses in the face of determined and repeated attacks by the German 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, supported by strong elements of two Infantry Divisions. The stubborn resistance of your Infantry elements, supported by artillery action, the devastating power and accuracy of which was unsurpassed, is outstanding. You repulsed, with exceedingly heavy losses to the enemy, several strong attacks on January 1, and numerous other attacks and continuous aggressive action since that date. The Division compelled the enemy to shift his main forces to another area. I congratulate every member of the Division and its supporting units for those courageous and successful actions.

* * *

TO : Commanding General, 45th Infantry Division,
APO 45.

I commend every officer and enlisted man of the Forty-fifth Infantry Division for meritorious and heroic achievement from January 3, 1945 to the present date. Ordered on the night of January 1st-2nd to shift your forces from the Siegfried Line to take over a sector from another unit, you completed the movement in considerably less time than could reasonably be expected. Arriving in the new sector, you found an exceedingly confused situation in the area being overrun by the enemy. With the steady coolness that has already made the Forty-fifth famous you immediately stemmed the main enemy advance and deepest penetration. The Germans employed the main parts of four powerful divisions against you. They reinforced these with a fresh SS Division on the fourth day of the attack. Rapidly shifting your defenses, you met each new thrust of the enemy. You repelled them, took the initiative from them, and forced them to take the defensive. You may well take great pride in these successes.

* * *


TO : Commanding General, 79th Infantry Division,
APO 79.*

Holding an important sector, the troops of the 79th Infantry Division received the main enemy attack of the present German offensive on 8 January. The Germans, forced to abandon efforts to pierce our lines to the West, launched a powerful coordinated attack against your positions. The splendid defensive action of your division has been most outstanding. Continued attempts of the powerful 21st Panzer Division were completely blocked and dispersed. In spite of the commitment of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division two days later, the entire enemy attack was contained. These accomplishments were made despite the necessity to extend your south flank a considerable distance.

I wish to commend each and every man in the 79th Infantry Division for his determined resistance and steadfast achievement in the face of superior enemy numbers.

* * *

*Task Force Linden composed of the 222nd, 232nd and 242nd Infantry regiments of the 42nd Division was attached to the 79th Division at this time and gave very valuable assistance in this outstanding action.



M/SGT JACK BESSEL

TO : Commanding General, Headquarters 100th Infantry
Division, APO 100.

The rugged American stubbornness of the combat elements of the 100th Infantry Division has played a tremendous part in stemming the tide of attack by superior enemy numbers. In the area of Rimling you successfully repulsed repeated enemy attempts to penetrate your lines, your great accomplishment forced the enemy to give up the offensive action on your front. Inflicting great losses to strong elements of three enemy divisions, you have successfully protected an important sector in the Hardt Mountains. When the forces of the powerful enemy drive carried him into a salient in the Bitch area, the prompt and effective extension of your lines to block his advance was a splendid example of skillful maneuver. I heartily commend all members of this division for their outstanding achievements.

/s/ JACOB L. DEVERS
JACOB L. DEVERS,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

278. Staff Memorandum Number 5 was issued on 13 January and gave the correct designation of the headquarters as "Headquarters, 6th Army Group".

279. On 14 January, General Smith, Chief of Staff, SHAEF, visited 6th Army Group Headquarters and perhaps the most important results of his visit were arrangements for movement of the 28th Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division from the rapidly shrinking ARDENNES salient to the 6th Army Group zone. A few days later, General Barr, in PARIS, initiated plans for similar movement of the 101st Airborne Division.

280. On 15 January the enemy reinforced his 25th Panzer Grenadier Division and 21st Panzer Division with elements of 7th Parachute Division and staged continuous attacks in a determined effort to effect a breakthrough in RITTER-SHOFFEN-HATTEN area. These attempts were blocked by the 14th Armored Division supported by elements of the 79th Division.

281. The day of 15 January was featured by continued heavy fighting by the 14th Armored Division in the RITTER-SHOFFEN-HATTEN area against very stubborn resistance and counter attacks. (DR 15 Jan)

282. On 16 January a memorandum was issued with subject, "Release of General Assignment Men for Training as Infantry Riflemen". It covered the matters of physical examination

and training of understudies. (147)

283. Also on 16 January elements of 12th Armored Division on the right of VI Corps and in conjunction with 3 DIA made an attack in which initial success was followed by withdrawals forced by intense enemy artillery fire.

284. On this same day First French Army established a VOSGES Sector on the Western face of the COLMAR bridgehead in an area previously occupied by the 3 DIA. It thus lay between the zones of I and II Corps and was commanded by Colonel Hogard directly under First French Army. Elements of the newly arrived 10th (Billotte) Division* were placed in this sector, command of the sector passing at noon on 18 January.

285. Operations for 17 January are covered in the "Red-line" dispatch sent the following day and paraphrased below:

The entire First French Army front yesterday was marked by enemy arty and patrol activity.

Operations begun yesterday against the HERRLISHEIM-OFFENDORF-GAMBSHEIM bridgehead were continued by elmts of the 12 Armd Div and 232 Inf Regt with slow progress. 2/3s of HERRLISHEIM has been taken and the advance has reached a line 1 kilometer west of OFFENDORF. Elmts of 2 Regts of 7 Para Div have occupied DENGOLSHEIM R 1921, STATTMATTEN R 2022, and DALHUNDEN R 1919. Elmts of the 14 Armd Div and 315th Inf are still heavily engaged in HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN against bitter resistance. The 157th Inf was making slow progress against very strong resistance in the HARDT Mountain salient.

The 103 Div is attached to the VI Corps. The XXI Corps now has under its command the 106 Cav Group and Task Force HERREN.

286. On 18 January elements of the 12th Armored Division were forced out of HERRLISHEIM and a defensive line established along the ZORN River. A passage between the RHINE and the MODER was cleared by heavy enemy reinforcements. Elements of the 103rd Division and 117th Cavalry Squadron were moved into the area to meet this threat.

287. By 18 January fragmentary oral and cabled instructions had been issued providing for passage to the offensive South of the STRASBOURG area. The secrecy of these instructions was very carefully safeguarded. The usual "Letter of

*See paragraph 260.

Instructions" covering the operation was not given full distribution until 6 February. It read as follows:

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U.S. ARMY

18 January 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number 9.

TO : CG First French Army
CG Seventh Army

Note: This Letter of Instructions is to confirm fragmentary instructions previously issued orally and by cable.

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.
b. Twelfth and Twenty-first Army Groups continue offensive. The flank of Twelfth Army Group adjacent to Northwest flank of Sixth Army Group remains on the defensive.

2. Sixth Army Group continues the defensive North and West of the STRASBOURG area, inclusive, and passes to the offensive South of the STRASBOURG area for the purpose of eliminating the COLMAR pocket and destroying the German forces West of the RHINE in that area.

BOUNDARIES: No change from Letter of Instructions Number 8.

3. a. First French Army

(1) Attack on South flank on 20 January 1945 with main effort so directed as to cut the road net in CERNAY - GUEBWILLER area, thereafter exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH Bridge.

(2) Attack on North flank on 22 January 1945 with main effort between COLMAR and SELESTAT, bypassing COLMAR, and exploiting in the direction of the BRISACH bridge.

(3) Continue defense of STRASBOURG area in accordance with provisions of Letters of Instructions Numbers 7 and 8, this headquarters.

(4) Protect South flank of Seventh Army; protect South flank of Sixth Army Group; protect FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier in currently assigned sector.

(5) See paras 3 b (2) and 3 x.

b. Seventh Army

(1) Continue defense in accordance with provisions of Letters of Instructions Numbers 7 and 8, this headquarters.

(2) Pass 2 DB to operational control of First French Army in sufficient time to take part in First French Army offensive. Times and places of passage of units to operational control of First French Army will be as agreed between CG First French Army and CG Seventh Army (Par 3 a (2)).

(3) Be prepared to assemble one armd div generally South of SAVERNE by daybreak 22 January 1945 for movement to North flank attack of First French Army and passage to operational control of CG First French Army on order (Par 3 a (2)).

(4) 10 Armd Div with one TD and AAA (AW) Bn attached, attached to Sixth Army Group by SHAEF, is attached to Seventh Army on arrival in SARREBOURG area. Movement of 10 Armd Div to SARREBOURG area will be accomplished with radio silence imposed; this restriction will not be lifted unless and until it becomes necessary to commit 10 Armd Div and its attachments to combat. This div and attachments will be prepared for return to SHAEF control at 1800 hours 27 January 1945.

(5) Protect Northwest flank Sixth Army Group.

(6) See para 3 x.

x. (1) 28 Inf Div with one TD and AAA (AW) Bn attached; one Bn 105mm How; one Bn 155mm How; and one Bn 4.5 gun, attached to Sixth Army Group by SHAEF, are attached to Seventh Army and are passed to operational control of CG First French Army upon arrival in the ST DIE area. All of these units will be sodeployed that they can be withdrawn from action for reversion to SHAEF at 1800 hours 27 January 1945. All of these units will enter Sixth Army Group area with silence imposed upon all radios; this restriction will not be lifted by First French Army prior to the opening of the main attack in the COLMAR - SELESTAT area.

(2) Movement of all units East of a North and South line through LUNEVILLE will be accomplished under cover of darkness, or by infiltration of small groups in such manner that normal traffic activity on roads will not be apparently increased.

(3) Upon initiating movement to First French Army complete radio silence will be imposed upon 2 DB. This restriction will not be lifted by First French Army prior to commission of this unit to the attack.

(4) The importance of preserving the utmost secrecy in preparation for the attack cannot be over emphasized. Armored vehicles, and transport of units in attack positions, will be concealed in buildings and in woods and by other camouflage expedients. All visible activity prior to the attack must be such as to indicate purely defensive intentions.

4. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ REUBEN E. JENKINS
REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

18 January 1945

ADMINISTRATIVE LETTER) (To accompany letter
: of Instruction No. 9)
NUMBER 9)

1. Responsibility for supply and evacuation of the 2nd DB and the units presently attached thereto, remains

with Seventh Army. The responsibility for supply and evacuation of U.S. units that are, or may be placed, under the operational control of the First French Army will remain a direct U.S. responsibility. See also paragraph 2, Administrative Letter Number 8, 5 January 1945.

2. Necessary supply and evacuation movements in the area of the First French Army to accomplish paragraph 1 above will be closely co-ordinated between the respective Army Commanders.

OFFICIAL:

DEVERS
Comdg.

/s/ ADCOCK
ADCOCK
G-4

288. The following letter was dispatched 19 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO : Commanding Officer, 197th Ordnance Battalion,
THRU: Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758

I want to commend the officers and men of your organization for their initiative and foresight in organizing and operating the Seventh Army Ordnance Emergency Repair Station near Domevre, France.

I am particularly impressed with the network of signs on the approaches to your station, and I am sure you gather many deserving customers in need of quick repairs.

It is by such efforts we keep our vehicles rolling in these days when we need them so badly. I take great pleasure in sending this commendation to you and your organization.

/s/ JACOB L. DEVERS
JACOB L. DEVERS,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

289. Enemy command organization, capabilities and intentions as of 20 January were of considerable interest. The following is an extract from the 6th Army Group G-2 Summary of that date.

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION
 - a. Organization of the German Command.

*

*

*

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preservation purposes.

Army Group OBERRHEIN under HIMMLER functions in an operational capacity through the Nineteenth Army in the COLMAR pocket, with LXIV Corps (198 Inf, 708 Inf, 189 VG, 16 VG and possibly 269 Inf Divisions) and LXIII Corps (338 VG, 159 VG and 716 Inf Divisions) as subordinate echelons. Its administrative function as a defense command is exercised through Armee-Gruppe OBERRHEIN (which may equate with a reported Twenty-third or Twenty-fourth Army similar to the Twenty-fifth Army in HOLLAND) under General der Artillerie and SS Obergruppenfuhrer Heinrich von MAUR. The subordinate echelons are 14 SS and 18 SS Corps, controlling replacement training units, police and Volkssturm in the area east of the RHINE.

The subordination and composition of the higher command controlling the offensive operations west of the RHINE between WISSEMBOURG and the southern limit of the bridgehead is open to question. 245 Infantry Division, the only divisional unit known definitely to be subordinate to LXXXIX Corps, has had practically no role in the present operation. 21 Panzer and 25 Pz Gr Divisions are known to be operating in conjunction in what is termed Operation Feuchtinger, named obviously after the Nazi favorite and panzer general last identified in command of 21 Panzer Division. 7 Para Division, whose arrival was evidently the signal for the beginning of the operation, committed only elements of its 20 Para Regiment at HATTEN. 19 and 21 Para Regiments crossed the RHINE into the bridgehead and are presently in contact there. The initial crossing was made by elements of 553 VG Division, which was directly controlled by 14 SS Corps. It was von MAUR, signing himself as Oberbefehlshaber der Armee-Gruppe OBERRHEIN on 5 January, who addressed the following to the units of his command: "I place my full trust and all my hopes in you so that in a few days I am able to report to the Fuehrer: The Swastika flies once again from the Strasbourg cathedral." On 13 January HIMMLER's congratulatory messages to the troops in the bridgehead was signed in his capacity as Oberbefehlshaber der Heeres-Gruppe OBERRHEIN. On 19 January the Reichsfuehrer's Escort Battalion was identified in the bridgehead. Finally, the identification of XXXIX Panzer Corps provides the higher tactical unit capable of controlling the offensive units already active in the area and the newly-arrived 10 SS Division.

b. Capabilities and Discussion.

The actual use and subordination of the offensive units concerned (the Reichsfuehrer's Escort Bn, 21 Pz, 25 Pz Gr, 10 SS and 7 Para Divisions), undoubtedly the strongest units on the whole Sixth US Army Group front and three of which were obviously brought in for the operation, deter-

mines not only the enemy's capabilities, but also his intentions in this area. The following capabilities may be listed.

(1) To stabilize the front from the Moselle to the HARDT Mountains, with spoiling attacks against the Allied bridgehead at SAARLAUTERN and holding attacks in the vicinity of the major cities. The low number and poor quality of the troops in the area makes the execution of this capability imperative and purely defensive in character. 11 Panzer Division does not represent sufficient offensive power to permit the enemy more than an aggressive defense and the possible employment in this area of salvaged remains from the ARDENNES diminishes as the Allied counteroffensive gathers momentum. Finally, there is no evidence of other reserves which the enemy's previous costly failures along the western edge of the HARDT Mountains must have taught him were necessary to make any venture profitable.

(2) To defend the COLMAR pocket, the Allied attack launched in the MULHOUSE area has robbed the enemy of any offensive capability he may have had in the southern sector. In the northern sector of the pocket, it has been established that the enemy's intentions were limited to the establishment of a main line of resistance on the ILL River. A reliable officer PW has stated that operations northward from the VOSGES pocket were intended to be only diversionary in character, with the main effort to be directed against STRASBOURG from the north.

(3) To attempt to capture STRASBOURG, Again the number and quality of troops does not permit execution of a capability allowed the enemy before 1 January, that of capturing SAVERNE and the entire ALSACE plain. Coordinated drives south from the eastern HARDT and through the HAGUE-NAU forest, west against SAVERNE from the RHINE, and north-east against MOLSHEIM would be necessary. Without increased reinforcements, the enemy is not capable of meeting all the requirements for such action. However, the capture of STRASBOURG would serve not only to maintain the initiative, but also as an extremely valuable morale factor within Germany. The excessive political tinge of the higher commands, the expressed intentions of the enemy in this area, and the obvious determination to gain some advantage from a poorly conducted military campaign into which good troops are now being thrown after the bad, lends some weight to the possibility that the operations are being controlled by Army Group OBERRHINE. A southward shift of units from HATTEN through the newly established corridor to the GAMBSHEIM area would be even more convincing evidence that XXXIX Panzer Corps has been provided with the best units at the disposal of the Army in order to save the Part's prestige. If HITLER could not enter ANTWERP, HIMMLER must at least take STRASBOURG.


290! On 20 January, in accordance with oral orders of General Devers to General Patch the VI Corps began a planned withdrawal to the general line, of the second delaying position. There was evidence that the enemy had planned to launch strong attacks on our original positions the following day and such attacks were actually launched in the BISCHWILLER area. (148)(149) Also the enemy was forced to move elements of the 2nd Mountain Division from the Seventh Army front to meet the French attack on the COLMAR Pocket. (148) This withdrawal was a source of considerable embarrassment to the enemy. In addition to wasting much ammunition, he found that before he could hope to inflict serious losses on our troops or threaten our new defensive line it would be necessary to follow up, hampered by obstacles and small delaying actions, definitely locate the new line by reconnaissance and probing attacks, and move an adequate supply of ammunition forward, this latter being a slow and laborious process in view of his limited transportation and the poor road net. The withdrawal saved our troops losses from artillery fire, served to maintain the integrity of units and afforded a welcome breathing spell.

291. During the night of 21-22 January the 101st Airborne Division completed its assembly in the DRULINGEN area in the zone of XV Corps.

292. From the standpoint of historical coverage the Reduction of the COLMAR Pocket presented a new problem. The operations of major U.S. units of 6th Army Group are normally covered by the Historical Section of Seventh Army. In this case, however, the entire U.S. XXI Corps was engaged under First French Army rather than Seventh Army. At a staff conference immediately after the reduction of the Pocket it was directed that the Public Relations Section furnish a writer to prepare an account of this operation from material to be furnished by the Historian.

293. Considerable information including the situation map photos were already on hand and, taking this material for check, the Historian, writer and illustrator made a four day tour of the battlefields visiting as many units as practicable before their transfer from the 6th Army Group area. Very valuable material was furnished from other sources including First French Army, Seventh Army and XXI Corps. The resulting account by Sergeant Pasme is included as Chapter VI.

294. The following letter was dispatched 21 January:



SIXTH ARMY GROUP

SITUATION MAP

22 JAN. 1945

TIME: 1030 A

NORTH FLANK

KILOMETRES

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

MILES

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO : Commanding Officer, 358th Fighter Group, APO 696.
THRU : Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force(Prov).
APO 374.

The remarkable record achieved by the 358th Fighter Group during the month of December 1944 is a tribute to the leadership of the Commander and the aggressive determination of each member of the Command.

The records show that this unit, operating on 146 missions with 1710 sorties during weather seldom favorable, wrought upon the enemy the destruction of 1010 railroad cars, 73 locomotives, 109 motor vehicles, 301 buildings and damaged seriously almost double those numbers. In addition, this unit effected 48 railroad cuts and destroyed or damaged numerous marshalling yards, bridges, supply dumps and other important objectives. In air combat, at least 28 enemy aircraft were shot from the skies, and others were rendered useless on the ground.

The accomplishments and example of this unit have been the subject of much favorable comment, and I am pleased to pass to you and to each individual of the 358th Fighter Group, my congratulations, and the gratitude of the ground forces which your efforts have so materially aided.

/s/ JACOB L. DEVERS
JACOB L. DEVERS,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

295. A new rear boundary for the armies and Combat Zone was announced 22 January. (150)

296. Also on 22 January General Orders Number 4 announced the award of Oak Leaf Clusters to two individuals and lesser awards to eighteen others. (151)

297. On 22 and 23 January Colonel Tarr, Adjutant General, 6th Army Group, visited the Adjutant General of Seventh Army, VI and XV Corps, the 45th and 100th Divisions and the 14th Armored Division. Need was apparent for earlier release of Rotation Leave quotas by ETO, prompt return of Medal of Honor recipients to the United States in accordance with a War Department directive, and coordination of the problems of administration presented by temporary attachment of divisions to the Army Group. During his trip Colonel Tarr also spent some time at the postal regulating station at SARREBURG. There had been considerable delay in mail service

particularly, V-Mail, but prior corrective action had been initiated and the SARREBURG station was operating efficiently.

298. During the night 22-23 January about seventy-five enemy tanks were reported to have crossed to the West bank of the RHINE Northeast of STRASBOURG. Other enemy movements toward this general area were also reported and it was estimated that he might be able to commit as many as three Panzer and two strong Infantry Divisions there. There were indications that the enemy planned to seize the forest five miles North of STRASBOURG and then attack in a southerly direction but West of the City. (Briefing)

299. On 23 January Colonel Morton, Ordnance Department visited Headquarters 6th Army Group. At a conference of interested officers explanations regarding the new V.T. or Pozit fuze recently introduced in FRANCE with marked success. He discussed design, production, applications, results and safety precautions. He also introduced Captain Tampico, Ord. Dept., who remained as a consultant on questions regarding the fuze. (40) On the same date there was initiated the showing of a series of secret staff combat film reports open to all officers of the headquarters.

300. Also on 23 January revision of Staff Procedure was announced in Staff Memorandum Number 7. (152)

301. On this same date there were outpost actions against strong enemy patrols all along the line of the VI Corps. The 35th Division (less 134th Inf) closed in the DIEUZE area, in the zone of the XV Corps. (149)

302. On 24 January VI Corps was subject to five probing attacks on its left by infantry and tanks. (149)

303. On 25 January VI Corps lines were subject to local penetrations by enemy probing attacks. These were contained and counter attacks launched to restore the original positions. An isolated enemy battalion in SHILLERSDORF was mopped up. XV Corps assumed command of the XXI Corps sector at 1100A. XXI Corps Headquarters was assigned to First French Army for operations.

304. About this time a very definite threat on the XV Corps front with much incoming rail traffic and increased radio activity. Conference with SHAEF resulted in agreement to move the 8th Armored Division from the PONT-a'-MOUSSON area to the Seventh Army area. However, before the move was actually begun, the situation became less threatening, and plans for the move were cancelled. (148)

305. On 26 January VI Corps eliminated all penetrations of its MLR and restored its original positions. The 12th U.S. Armored Division was attached to II French Corps for operational control and assembled Northwest of STRASBOURG.

306. As soon as the 75th Division was made available, (26-27 Jan) General Devers decided to move XXI Corps down to take over the attack from the North of COLMAR Pocket, the II French Corps to cover its left and defend STRASBOURG at all cost. This caused revision of General de Lattre's plans to conform. (148)

307. By 27 January the 101st Airborne Division had relieved two regiments of the 42nd Division. (DR 27 Jan)

308. On 27 January General Eisenhower accompanied by his G-2, General Kenneth Strong (British), his G-3, General Bull and General Somervell, visited General Devers at VITTEL to learn the situation on his front and discuss problems. General Eisenhower was quite emphatic in expressing his desire for reduction of the COLMAR Pocket as soon as possible in spite of the serious obstacles of heavy snow and reduced combat effectiveness of French units. He gave no new instructions, leaving 6th Army Group to continue reduction of the COLMAR Pocket in order to release troops for other operations. After the departure of General Eisenhower's party, General Devers called a staff meeting at which he outlined plans for operations of the 6th Army Group as far ahead as the latter part of March. Briefly covering the situation General Devers pointed out that the Seventh US Army and the First French Army were engaged on a front extending for 225 miles. The Seventh Army included 13 Infantry, 2 Armored and 1 Airborne Divisions and was short 800 officers and 20,000 enlisted men. The First French Army included 12 Infantry and 4 Armored Divisions of which 3 Infantry and 1 Armored Divisions were U.S. units. This army had an infantry shortage of 4,700. Opposing the Seventh Army there were estimated to be 35,400 combat effectives and 65 tanks and S.P. guns.

309. The General then outlined plans for future operations in the following sequence:

a. To complete reduction of COLMAR Pocket not later than 15 February.

b. To hold the line of the RHINE with 3 French Infantry Divisions supported by 2 French Armored Divisions and at the same time retrain and refit First French Army units by rotation.

c. To reduce the GAMBSHEIM - BISCHWILLER Pocket.

This operation could be concurrent with reduction of the COLMAR Pocket.

d. To stage a limited objective attack for capture of dominating terrain in the BITCHE area by 28 February.

e. Beginning 1 March to move the 1st DMM to the ALPINE Front releasing the U.S. Task Force from that area and returning U.S. units to Seventh Army as follows:

442nd RCT	1 AAW Bn
65th Infantry (less 2 Bns)	2 Bns 75mm Pack How Arty
1 Bn 155 How	1 Bn Combat Engineers
1 Bn 90mm AAA	(Appropriate Service Units)

f. The 27th Alpine Division to remain on the Alpine front under command of a French general officer directly under Headquarters 6th Army Group.

g. Seventh Army to conduct intensive refitting and retraining program during first half of March in preparation for resumption of offensive when directed by SHAEF.

h. The 42nd, 63rd and 70th Divisions were expected to be completely operational by 15 February.

i. To stage an offensive on existing Seventh Army front would require 3 Corps comprising 4 Armored and approximately 13 Infantry Divisions.

j. In case Seventh Army front should be extended to the MOSELLE and divisions on temporary loan from SHAEF withdrawn an additional corps with two infantry divisions and one armored division would be required. (148)

After the meeting General Devers said he was going to the North flank of the First French Army and spend most of his time in that area to expedite operations. He left on that mission the morning of 29 January. On the same day General Barr visited the opposite flank to observe and expedite progress there.

310. An estimate of the enemy situation at this time is given in Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 19 of which the first paragraph is quoted below:

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The enemy organization along the Sixth US Army Group

front has been clarified.

Army Group G controls the front from the Moselle through approximately the WISSEMBOURG - HAGUENAU road. Under it the First Army operates through the following corps: LXXXII Infantry (11 Pz, 416 Inf, 719 Inf and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 Inf, 17 SS PG, and 559 VG Divs); XC Infantry (257 VG, 256 VG and 6 SS Mtn Divs); LXXXIX Infantry (245 Inf, 47 Inf and 36 Inf Divs).

Army Group OBERRHEIN includes the operational Nineteenth Army in the COLMAR pocket, the administrative defence command known as Armee-Gruppe OBERRHEIN (possibly Twenty-third or Twenty-fourth Army), and the XXXIX Panzer Corps. The subordinate units in the pocket remain unchanged, except for the replacement of 269 Infantry Division (identified on the Russian front) by 2 Mountain Division. The administrative role of XIV SS and XVIII SS Corps has been confirmed by agent reports and some documentary evidence. XXXIX Panzer Corps has conducted the operations in the HAGUENAU-RHINE area with 25 Panzer Grenadier, 7 Parachute, 10 SS and 21 Panzer Divisions under command, as well as those units in the GAMBSHEIM area controlled by the staff of 553 Division.

The offensive power of the enemy has definitely diminished along the front. West of INGWILLER, there has been practically no offensive action. On the contrary, an excellent agent source reported various defensive preparations already in effect. Both 719 and 347 Infantry Divisions have been absorbing reinforcements from 172 Reserve Division's various units, while 19 Infantry was forced to recall its errant unit from the HARDT. Any reinforcements received by 17 SS were necessary to permit the spread of this battered formation, whose original combat efficiency was depreciated by its captured commander. Nor can the divisions in the HARDT be held in higher esteem, with the possible exception of 6 SS Mountain, whose losses from a second surrounded battalion are revealing both poor tactics and even poorer quality personnel.

East of the HARDT the enemy has by no means achieved a success worthy of his announced intentions and the units delegated for the operation. The aggressive actions were in the nature of probing attacks, searching for the weak point where his armor might be effectively used. In addition terrain factors forced him to canalize his efforts along routes which were obvious and easily controlled. This indecision was prolonged to the point where extremely bad weather and events on the other fronts decided the issue for him. By the end of the period the enemy's offensive intentions were no longer possible of execution.

In the VOSGES pocket the enemy was reduced to shuttling his units to meet attacks from north and south. Commitment of mobile formations in the south was followed by a parcelling out of the reserves, when even 2 Mountain Division was found operating on both sectors. A distinct lowering of the quality of forces in the CERNAY sector set in early, while even the enemy's better troops were having extreme difficulty holding well prepared defensive positions in blizzards propitious for such an intention.

As for strategic reserves, there were none identifiable along the whole Sixth US Army Group front. 361 Infantry Division was in fact cannibalized, while its staff retired to Germany. 47 Infantry Division, hardly an impressive unit, had to be brought in from the northern front and was committed immediately after a road march from LANDAU to HATTEN. 245 Infantry Division was approaching the lines in an obviously relief capacity. 2 Mountain Division drew part of its complement from 188 Reserve Division in Austria and 5 Mountain Division on the Italian Alpine front. 30 SS, according to prisoners from another unit, was in such a demoralized condition that the enemy did not dare to use it, for fear of mass desertion. Finally, documentary evidence for the presence of II SS Corps is completely discounted, as merely the rough draft of a plan whose temporarily pregnant possibilities never achieved fruition.

In sum, the enemy has lost the initiative.

b. Capabilities

1. From the Moselle to the Rhine:

(a) to attempt to stabilize the front, withdrawing if necessary to the successive positions along the Moder, the Maginor Line, the Siegfried Line. The high cost of his present operations, the inability to use armored formations efficiently under actual terrain and weather conditions, definite indications of their withdrawal, the preparation of defensive positions with a subsequent economy of forces and the lack of contact for some days combine to make this capability the most favored.

(b) to defend east to the HARDT and carry on his attempt to recapture STRASBOURG. Bad weather and energetic resistance have successfully thwarted any serious enemy advances with heavy losses to his present strength. The turn of events on other fronts has deprived him of the reinforcements necessary for further progress. This capability is not favored.

2. In the COLMAR pocket:

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(a) to reinforce and attempt to maintain his present lines. Here again reinforcements are lacking and available strength is being depleted to a point where manpower earmarked for the Siegfried Line is being drawn upon. The present defensive position running from MULHOUSE through CERNAY, along the VOSGES and then the canals to the Rhine, is being forced and will fall under determined attacks. The danger to the Nineteenth Army of a sudden breakthrough from north and south cannot be under-estimated by the enemy. Finally, the cessation of active operations in the HAGUENAU area makes no longer imperative the necessity to keep occupied a large part of the Allied forces. The possibility of an eventual intention to break out against STRASBOURG from the BENFELD area is no longer considered. This capability is not favored.

(b) to retire in good order into the Siegfried Line after having completed the establishment of a bridge-head position in the NEUF BRISACH area. A retreat into the Siegfried line would permit an economy of forces now necessary to the enemy, releasing some for use in the HAGUENAU area eventually. Gruppe von OPPEN has already been identified making ready the ancient fortress area of NEUF BRISACH, under exactly similar circumstances to those prevailing earlier at BELFORT. Such a position would effectively deny use of the Rhine valley to the Allies and serve to protect the vital east bank communication lines for the enemy. This capability is favored, particularly in conjunction with 1 (a) above.

311. Staff Memorandum Number 8 was issued 28 January, Section I thereof is quoted below:

I-----ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES FOR STAFF FUNCTIONS
INVOLVING SERVICE TROOPS, COMBAT, AND SUPPORTING TROOPS,
AND G-1 AGENCIES

1. Effective immediately, G-1 will be responsible for the movement, assignment, attachment, reorganization, estimate of additional requirements, and procurement of the following:

- a. Army Postal Units.
- b. Postal Regulating Sections.
- c. Machine Records Units.
- d. Finance Disbursing Sections.
- e. Special Service Companies.

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- f. Reinforcement Companies.
- g. Reinforcement Headquarters & Headquarters Bn. Dets.
- h. Reinforcement Headquarters & Headquarters Co. Depots.
- i. Military Police.
- j. Army Ground Forces Bands and Army Service Forces Bands. (except Division Bands)
- k. Reinforcements.

2. G-4 will be responsible for the movement, assignment, attachment, reorganization, estimate of additional requirements, and procurement of the following service units:

- a. Medical.
- b. Ordnance.
- c. Quartermaster.
- d. Transportation.
- e. All Signal Units except:
 - (1) Radio Intelligence.
 - (2) Photographic.
 - (3) Pigeon.
 - (4) Construction Battalions and Companies.
 - (5) Operation Battalions and Companies.
 - (6) Signal Battalions, Corps, or Army.
- f. All Engineer Units except:
 - (1) Combat Regiments, Groups, Battalions, and Companies.
 - (2) Heavy Ponton Companies.
 - (3) Light Ponton Companies (Including Bailey Bridges).
 - (4) Treadway Bridge Companies.

g. All Chemical Units except:

- (1) Chemical Mortar Battalions.
- (2) Smoke Generator Companies.
- (3) Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment
Smoke Generator Companies.

3. G-3 will be responsible for matters concerning all other troops except as limited by paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

4. Proper coordination will be maintained between Staff Section wherever necessary.

312. On 28 January patrols were active along the Seventh Army front.

313. The following units were on temporary loan to 6th Army Group from SHAEF; 28th Division, 75th Division, 101st Airborne Division, 10th Armored Division and 35th Division; and by this date there were indications of possible enemy withdrawals and change to a defensive attitude opposite the Seventh Army front. Accordingly on 28 January the 35th Division was ordered relieved at once for movement North. It was relieved the following night and on its way the 30th. (148)

314. Personal message General Devers to General de Lattre 28 January:

1. CG 7th Army desires to take advantage of enemy weakness in the pocket North of STRASBOURG between GAMBSHEIM and BISCHWEILER and requests full assistance of your troops north of STRASBOURG in a coordinated effort to drive the German out of this pocket west of the RHINE and south of the MODER River. This undertaking is to be carried out by the CG VI Corps.
2. I desire that you direct the commander of your forces in your sector north of STRASBOURG to contact CG VI Corps at once to coordinate action. I desire that your attack be as strong as possible in an all-out effort to eject the German. The security of STRASBOURG will thus be definitely insured.
3. Responsibility for coordination of the effort of his own forces with that of the French Commander rests with CG VI Corps.
4. Your efforts to reduce the COLMAR pocket must not be reduced.

5. Please advise me of your actions and consider this as a matter of great urgency.

315. General Orders Number 6 covering the award of decorations was issued 28 January. (153)

316. A new Manning Table for the headquarters was issued 31 January. It covered only the allotments of personnel under T/O and E 200-1, 26 October 41, and totalled 203 Officers, 14 Warrant Officers and 342 Enlisted Men, an aggregate of 559. (154)

317. In response to requests from the press, late in January, the Public Relations Section prepared and released a few paragraphs of biographical material relating to General Devers' career. The release is quoted below:

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
Public Relations Section
APO 23, U. S. Army

January, 1945

BIOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL: LT. GEN. JACOB L. DEVERS

Fighting on the southern flank of the Western Front are the American and French troops of Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers' 6th Army Group. In his U.S. 7th and First French Armies, he is directing the troops which in four and a half months fought their way from the beaches of the French Riviera to the Rhine River and into parts of Germany.

As Commanding General of the 6th Army Group, General Devers has called upon his experience with armor, artillery, infantry, and as an organizer, to mold together a fighting force which has been instrumental in liberating thousands of square miles -- more than half of France -- inflicting unnumbered casualties and capturing more than 170,000 Germans. In an offensive launched on 13 November 1944 his armies broke through the deadly Vosges Mountains and established themselves on the Rhine River and, beyond the Maginot Line, reached German soil.

Defeated at great cost in his Ardennes offensive, the enemy selected Alsace as a second major objective and, on New Year's Day, struck across the Rhine and through the Siegfried Line at the greatly extended 6th Army Group sector. He was frustrated by the brilliant defensive strategy of Devers and his subordinate commanders. This strategy, which comprised abruptly going on the defensive, for the protection of approximately one-half the Western Front, resulted in one of the outstanding defensive actions of the war.

General Devers came to the Mediterranean Theater after he had reorganized and schooled thousands of U.S. troops in the United Kingdom. As Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations, he was responsible for much of the planning and training for the landings in Normandy. A leading exponent of aggressive, offensive warfare, he taught the troops under him the cooperative use of armor, infantry, air and the Services of Supply.

As Commanding General of the Armored Force from August, 1941 until May, 1943, General Devers activated, trained and equipped twelve armored divisions and numerous separate tank battalions, which constituted a large part of the strength of this powerful, new branch of the American Army.

His background in artillery is a brilliant chapter in the theory and practice of that arm. As instructor at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and after the First World War as officer in charge of gunnery at the Field Artillery School, he taught improved firing techniques which are still in use.

He received his first star as Chief of Staff in Panama.

When the U.S. acquired new outposts in the destroyer swap with Great Britain, President Roosevelt appointed General Devers senior army officer on the board to select sites for Army and Navy air bases. He flew many thousand miles selecting these bases, which have proven of inestimable value.

Following this, he was named Commanding General of the Ninth Infantry Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he was also post commander. When General Devers arrived at Fort Bragg, it was a small post composed of 5,000 troops. Before he left he had made it the largest in American -- housing 65,000 troops. Under his supervision, more than 2,500 buildings were constructed in a few months, and there was no work stoppage among 35,000 workers.

Born on 8 September 1887 in York, Pennsylvania, General Devers has Irish ancestors on his father's side and Pennsylvania Dutch on his mother's. He entered the United States Military Academy when he was 18 years of age. At West Point, he was ardent athlete. Although his top weight was 140 pounds, he excelled in baseball, basketball and lacrosse. Later he became graduate manager of athletics.

General Devers wears the Distinguished Service Medal with an Oak Leaf Cluster, is a Knight Commander of the Bath, and in addition holds the Degree of Grand Officer of the Brazilian Order of Military Merit. He now controls what is virtually the entire regular Army of France. In the capa-

city of Commanding General of the 6th Army Group, he is the first non-French military leader in France's history to have under him so large a French force.

318. During the month of January only patrol and harassing actions were carried out along the Franco-Italian border. Cumulative statistics since 21 November for the 44th AAA Brigade in this front are as follows: Total killed, captured, and missing 35; total wounded 99; total prisoners captured 55.

319. During January the number of G-5 detachments increased from 24 to 36.

Other Civil Affairs/Military Government activity in the 6th Army Group area during January was overshadowed by the handling of the refugee problem which arose from the back-and-forth character of the fighting north and northeast of Strasbourg during much of that period.

Thanks to effective advance planning and arrangements by the various operations divisions of G-5, and the cooperation of other U.S. Army personnel and French agencies, dislocations which might otherwise have hampered military operations and had tragic consequences for the civilian population were dealt with in an orderly and expeditious fashion.

Approximately 9,000 refugees and 4,000 displaced persons were evacuated from the 6th Army Group area during the month by Army truck and by train, without hindering the tactical operations and with as much attention to the well being of the refugees as was possible under the circumstances. (155)

320. The supply situation during January was at times precarious. Difficulties are indicated in the following extract from the G-4 After Action Report.*

II TRANSPORTATION

1. Rail

a. With the transfer of the mission of the Seventh Army from the offensive to the defensive, the rail line immediately behind the defensive positions became of utmost importance, not so much in the actual support but with the evacuation of supplies and civilian refugees. This line, Strasbourg and Haguenau to the west was utilized to its

*Information in paragraphs 321 to 328 incl from same source.

fullest capacity in these operations.

b. During the month the 28th, 35th and 75th Infantry Divisions were moved into the 6th Army Group area by rail for the most part. After closing in the Luneville area, movements into the forward combat areas were made by highway. In addition to the U.S. Divisions, the 10th French Infantry Division was moved from the Paris area to the First French Army front.

c. Two American and one French divisions were placed under the operational control of the First French Army. The supply responsibility for the U.S. Divisions remained with the Seventh Army. Seventh Army's levels of supply not being adequate and the fact that rail communications were almost at a standstill due to snow and freezing conditions brought about a critical shortage of all classes of supply within the Seventh Army. Freezing of French engines, watering facilities, extreme cold and drifting snow caused at one time a 6 hour stoppage of rail traffic on the main supply route. This situation was relieved to a great extent by augmenting the French locomotives with U.S. motive power operated by American Railway Operating personnel, use of snow plows, military personnel and civilians, clearing tracks of snow. During the period Seventh Army's and First French Army's receipts dropped to an all time low, however, the near catastrophe was averted without any serious consequence occurring.

d. Rail rehabilitation during January was hampered very much by the inclement weather. The damaged tunnel at Champagney still blocked the Lure-Belfort Line; and the Dannemarie viaduct kept the Belfort-Mulhouse Line out of operation. With the exception of these two blocks the remaining portions of the line were ready for operations. Work on both of these obstructions was pushed during January.

e. Normal reconstruction of rail lines in support of the Seventh Army continued during January. The rail line, Saverne to Molsheim, was placed in operation and was utilized for the support of the U.S. Divisions under operational control of the First French Army.

321. Highway traffic and road maintenance were serious problems. Two divisions were brought into the Army area by highway and there was an unusual amount of local movement within the forward Army area. Rail tie-ups called for the establishment of a long distance truck delivery service from Delta Base and CONAD. Icy roads caused accidents, road blocks and extra maintenance of vehicles.

322. Air supply drops were successfully made 10 January to units of the 1st DMI isolated in the COLMAR Pocket.

323. There was a decrease in reserve supplies during January because of reduced shipments, additional units and delay in delivery due to heavy snowfall.

324. The use of separate lines of communications by SOLOC and COMZONE ETOUSA for supply of the 6th and 12th Army Groups developed lack of flexibility in shifting reserve supplies for the five divisions transferred from the 12th to the 6th Army Group. This was pointed out to SHAEF and ETOUSA and plans were made for the absorption of SOLOC by COMZONE ETOUSA.

325. It had become evident that replacement factors for tanks and other heavy ordnance were in need of revision. General Somervell, Commanding General Army Service Forces was apprised of the situation during his visit to the Theater and he promised an increase. The need of Army Group Staffs to be furnished advance information on supplies in supply channels was also stressed.

326. Some 22,000 F.F.I. troops in the BORDEAUX area, not on the Rearmament Program, were at least partially clothed and equipped from British miscellaneous sources by 6th Army Group action with the help of SHAEF.

327. In early January due to a combination of unfavorable conditions a backlog of patients was built up in the Armies. This situation was later relieved by securing additional medical units and hospital train service.

328. The situation during January with respect to service troops is outlined in the G-4 After Action Report as follows:

V. SERVICE TROOPS

1. The approved allocation of service troops for 6th Army Group was published by ETOUSA, based upon decisions reached at ETOUSA meeting of 27 December 1944. Expected arrivals by months were indicated.

2. As the arrival of service units destined for 6th Army Group was extremely slow, SHAEF was requested to expedite their movement. As a consequence, 12th Army Group was directed by SHAEF to release certain service units for assignment to this Headquarters, in order that Seventh Army's overall troop position might be strengthened. Some relief was obtained during the month.

3. Necessary action was initiated with 12th Army Group to attach approximately 12,000 service troops to 6th Army Group for support of the five new divisions, temporarily attached for operations in the Colmar pocket.

4. This Headquarters was requested by SHAEF to determine 6th Army Group's requirements for dog teams to be used in evacuation of wounded. As a result of survey initiated by Seventh Army, no requirements for teams of this type was indicated.

5. The renewed activity of the First French Army in the Colmar area under adverse weather conditions increased the burden on the already over-taxed French service units, particularly Ordnance and Medical. In order to relieve this over-load as much as possible, one Ordnance MAM Co was recalled from the WFF area, one Ordnance HAM Co, one Engineer Maintenance Co, two Medical Ambulance Platoons, and one Evacuation Hospital (400) were moved from 901st French Base to the Army area.

329. Extracts from the G-1 After Action Report for January are given below:

	U.S. FORCES	FRENCH FORCES	TOTAL
Killed.	1,877	1,475	3,352
Wounded	8,907	7,289	16,196
Missing	4,678	1,539	6,217
Captured.	159		159
Total Battle Casualties . . .	15,621	10,303	25,924
Non-Battle Casualties including Sick(Hospitalized) . .	18,528	29,160	47,688
Total Casualties.	34,149	39,463	73,612
Sick and Wounded returned to Units.	14,176	11,874	26,050
Balance (Loss for Month). . .	19,973	27,589	47,562
Reinforcements received . . .	22,908	23,205	46,113
Balance - Gain or Deficiency for the Month.	(Gain) 2,935	(Def) 4,384	1,449

	U.S. FORCES	FRENCH FORCES	TOTAL
T/O Strength of Command	353,266	284,055	637,321
Assigned Strength	332,221	326,353	658,574
Actual Strength	318,722	296,099	614,821
Infantry Shortage	17,445	9,193	26,638
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Prisoners of War Captured during the Month	8,725	2,697	11,422
Prisoners of War Captured (Cumulative)	81,298	74,241	155,539

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SECTION III

CHRONOLOGY

DATE

1944

- 3 December. Seventh Army passed 2nd DB to Operational control of FFA. (First French Army)
- 5 December. Seventh Army passed 36th Division to operational control of FFA.
- 13 December. Maginot defenses penetrated at several points.
- 14 December. 1st DMI began movement to WFF in BORDEAUX area.
- 15 December. Elements of VI Corps entered Germany in vicinity of NIEDERLAUTERBACH.
- 16 December. German Ardennes offensive began.
- 17 December. VI Corps contacted forward positions of Siegfried Line.
- 21 December. Sixth Army Group directed to assume defensive and take over Twelfth Army Group front as far West as SAARLAUTERN in view of Rundstedts offensive in the North.
- 21 December. 3rd Infantry Division passed to operational control of First French Army, relieving 36th Infantry Division which was returned to control of Seventh Army.
- 25 December. 87th Division relieved from Seventh Army and assigned to SHAEF. Cleared Seventh Army zone on its movement to REIMS.
- 27 December. Seventh Army assembled XXI Corps (36th Div and 12th Armd Div) in PHALSBOURG - SARREBOURG area. This Corps as SHAEF reserve prepared to move on short notice.
- 28 December. Letter of Instructions Number 7 issued placing both armies completely on defensive and outlining main position.
- 29 December. 2nd DB passed to operational control of Seventh Army.

SECTION III

CHRONOLOGY

DATE
1945

- 7 January. Letter of Instructions Number 8 issued.
- 12 January. Russian winter drive on Eastern front begins.
- 13 January. XXI Corps under General Milburn becomes operational.
- 17 January. 10th Armored Division elements closed in XXI Corps sector.
- 18 January. Letter of Instructions Number 9 issued. 6th Army Group passes to the offensive South of the STRASBOURG area.
- 20 January. French I Corps launches attack on South of COLMAR Pocket.
- 21 January. 101st Airborne Division begins to arrive in XV Corps sector.
- 22 January. French II Corps, including 3rd U.S. Division launches attack on North of COLMAR Pocket.
- 23 January. 35th Division (less 134th Inf) closed in XV Corps zone.
- 25 January. Hq & Hq Co XXI Corps together with organic corps troops passed to control of First French Army. XV Corps took over control of XXI Corps sector.
- 29 January. XXI Corps assumed command of sector held by 3rd and 28th Divisions with 75th Division and 5th DB attached.
- 31 January. 35th Division passed from Seventh Army area.

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SECTION II

REFERENCES

REF NO.	FILE NO.	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	DOC NO.
107.	Hq 6 AG G.O. #11 1 Dec 44 & G.O. #2 11 Jan 45	Military Commission Regulations.	69.
108.	Hq 6 AG G.O. #12 1 Dec 44	Awards and Decorations. Citation for Legion of Merit - M/Sgt Robert R. Jimerson.	70.
109.	Hq 6 AG Annex I 1 Dec 44	Letter to CG First French Army - Movement of units scheduled for Operation INDEPENDENCE.	71.
110.	Hq 6 AG Adm Ltr. #4 3 Dec 44	Rear Boundary Combat Zone FRANCO-ITALIAN Border. Notes of Colonel Parkman, G-5, 17 April 45.	
111.	8 Dec 44	Citations: Captain Erman M. Newman; Pfc. Carl Macmahon; Captain Roy H. Sheehan; Captain Albert S. Lawson.	72.
112.	AG 380.01/4 B-O 9 Dec 44	Letter to CG's 7th & 1st French Army & 44th AAA Brigade - Military Security	73.
113.	AG 201 8 Dec 44	Message from General Eisenhower - Appointment of Colonel Lenzner to Brigadier General effective 14 Nov 44.	
114.	AG 370.5/52 -O 10 Dec 44	Letter 6 AG to all concerned - Movement of Advance Detachment from VITTEL to PHALSBOURG.	74.
115.	Hq 6 AG Staff Memo #46 14 Dec	Appointment of Lt. Col. Edouard du Souzy as Chief of French Mission.	
116.	Hq 6 AG Staff Memo #45 14 Dec	Appointment of Colonel Hubert W. Collins as Acting Engineer.	
117.	Hq 6 AG Memo 21 Dec 44	Infiltrations of enemy through our lines in American uniforms & vehicles	75.
118.	29 April 45	Notes of General Harrison and Colonel Torrielli, G-2.	
119.	AG 370.5-1 (Fr) 22 Dec 44	Message to WFF - Movement of units to SAVERNE by fastest possible means by road and rail.	76.

REF NO.	FILE NO.	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	DOC NO.
120.	22 Dec 44	Citations given 22 December	77.
121.	AG 311.22/1 -0 22 Dec 44	Letter to CG's - Personal Cablegrams and Radiograms, EFM & SCM transmission	
122.	Hq 6 AG Adm Ltr #6 23 Dec 44	Supply and Evacuation of units trans- ferring from operational control of 3rd to 7th Army	78.
123.	29 Dec 1944	Conference with General Jenkins, G-3 at his office in VITTEL. (Paragraphs 217-222 inclusive)	
124.	29 April 45	Notes of General Harrison and Colonel Torrielli, G-2. (Paragraph 219)	
125.	AG 370.5-1 (Fr) 25 Dec 44	Message from French Forces - Arrival of units in SAVERNE area by 31 Dec.	79.
126.	Hq 6 AG Adm Instr #8 26 Dec 44	Administrative reports from Major Commands of Sixth Army Group.	80.
127.	29 Dec 44	Citations given 29 December.	81.
128.	Historical Report G-5 Section 1-31 December 1944	Paragraph 6 of Historical Report, G-5 Section Sixth Army Group.	

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SECTION II

REFERENCES

REF NO.	FILE NO.	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	DOC NO.
129.	January 1945	Interview with General Jenkins at VITTEL, early January 1945. Paragraphs 237-240 inclusive.	
130.	Hq 6 AG Staff Memo #2 3 Jan 45	Battle Participation Awards Germany Campaign.	82.
131.	January 1945	Interview with General Shepard, DC/S, at VITTEL, early January 1945.	
132.	2 Jan 1945	Letter from General de Lattre to General Devers - Defense of STRASBOURG.	83.
133.	AG 381-4 (TS) 5 Jan 45	Message to CGs 7th & 1st French Armies - Plans for defense of STRASBOURG. Message to CGs 7th & First French Armies - Approval of STRASBOURG defense plans.	---
134.	January 1945	Interview, General Jenkins, G-3, at VITTEL early Jan.	
135.	AG 381-4 2 Jan 45	Message from General Devers to General de Lattre.	
136.		Overlay of ROYAN.	84.
137.	13 Jan 45	Letter to General Devers from General de Larminat - Bombing of ROYAN.	85.
138.	17 Jan 45	Letter to General Devers from General Royce - Bombing of ROYAN.	86.
139.	23 Jan 45	Extract of Colonel Swett's report on Bombing of ROYAN.	87.
140.	18 Jan 45	Letter from General Devers to CG, WFF - Bombing of ROYAN.	88.
141.	Hq 6 AG Dist List #1 5 Jan 45	Distribution policy for Hq 6th Army Group.	89.

REF NO.	FILE NO.	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	DOC NO.
142.		Recommendations of Supporting & Service Troops for Diversion to 6th Army Group.	90.
143.	AG 370.5/16(Gen) 6 November 44	Breakdown of Service Units.	91.
144.	10 Jan 45	Public Relations Weekly Report ending 5 Jan 45.	92.
145.	12 Jan 45	Citations for Legion of Merit.	93.
146.	AG 381-4 (TS) 12 Jan 45	Message to First French Army - Lack of defense in II French Corps zone.	
147.	Hq 6 AG Memo 16 Jan 45	To all concerned - Release of General Assignment Men for Tng as Infantry Riflemen.	94.
148.	30 January 45	Interview, General Jenkins, G-3, at VITTEL.	
149.		G-3 After Action Report for January.	
150.	Hq 6 AG Adm Ltr #10 22 Jan 45	Rear Boundary of Armies.	95.
151.	Hq 6 AG G.O. #4 22 Jan 45	Awards and Decorations.	96.
152.	Hq 6 AG Staff Memo #7 23 Jan	Staff Procedure.	97.
153.	Hq 6 AG G.O. #6 28 Jan 45	Awards and Decorations.	98.
154.	AG 320.3/6 A-0 31 Jan 45	To all concerned - Allotment of Grades and Ratings to Hq 6th Army Group.	99.
155.		Para 1 & 5 Historical Report G-5 Section, 6th Army Group. Period 1 - 31 January 1945.	